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Abstract
This paper evaluates the impact of public employment on private sector activity using the re-
location of the German federal government from Berlin to Bonn in the wake of the Second World
War as a source of exogenous variation. To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a simple
economic geography model in which public sector employment in a city can crowd out private
employment through higher wages and house prices, but also generates potential productivity and
amenity spillovers. We nd that relative to a control group of cities, Bonn experiences a substantial
increase in public employment. However, this results in only modest increases in private sector
employment with each additional public sector job destroying around 0.2 jobs in industries and cre-
ating just over one additional job in other parts of the private sector. We show how this nding can
be explained by our model and provide several pieces of evidence for the mechanisms emphasised
by the model.
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1 Introduction
Following Krugman (1991), there has been a wave of research investigating the spatial distribution
of economic activity. By and large, this literature has concentrated on the location choices of rms
and workers in the private sector. However, in most advanced economies, a substantial share of the
workforce is employed in the public sector.1 This is important for at least two reasons. First, the spatial
distribution of public employment is unlikely to be determined exclusively by market forces. Indeed,
many governments use public employment as a form of regional policy and create public sector jobs in
economically lagging regions.2 Second, the distribution of public employment across locations should
have important impacts on the location of private sector activity through its general equilibrium impact
on wages and housing costs and also through potential productivity and amenity spillovers from the
public to the private sector.
In this paper we use the relocation of the German federal government from Berlin to Bonn in the
wake of the Second World War as a source of exogenous variation to evaluate the causal impact of
public employment on the spatial distribution of private sector activity. This approach has a number
of attractive features. First, the arrival of the federal government in Bonn was a large and plausibly
exogenous shock to public employment, which was driven by factors that are unrelated to the local
economic performance of Bonn. Second, we are able to follow the impact of this shock over several
decades, which allows us to capture the long-run general equilibrium response to this shock. Third,
we are able to provide a number of pieces of evidence on the mechanisms through which public and
private sector employment interact.
To guide our empirical analysis we develop a simple theoretical model which builds on Helpman
(1998) and Redding and Sturm (2008). In the model both private sector rms and the public sector
demand labour across dierent cities. The public sector produces a global public good which enters
the utility of all workers in the economy equally. The private sector consists of both a tradable and non-
tradable sector. Firms in the tradable sector produce manufacturing varieties which are tradable across
cities at some cost while varieties produced by rms in the non-tradable sector can only be consumed
locally. In the model the location of public employment aects the location choices of private sector
workers and rms through a number of channels. On the one hand, increases in public employment in
a location crowd out private sector employment through increases in house prices and nominal wages.
On the other hand, public sector employment can potentially promote private sector activity through
productivity and amenity spillovers from the public to the private sector and also by dampening the
extent of local competition.
1 OECD (2009) reports that the share of public employment across OECD countries in 2005 ranges from highs close to
30% in Sweden and Norway to lows of less than 10% in Switzerland, Korea and Japan with an OECD average in 2005 of
14.4%. In many countries public employment is higher than employment in industry.
2 Alesina, Danninger, and Rostagno (2001), for example, argue that in Italy public employment is mostly used as a
redistributive device from the richer North to the poorer South.
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Using panel data for Bonn and 40 control cities covering the period from 1925 to 1987, we examine
the predictions of our model. The 40 control cities are the 20 cities ranked just above and just below
Bonn in terms of total 1939 population. We employ both a dierence-in-dierences comparison be-
tween Bonn and the control cities and also construct a synthetic control city for Bonn using the 40
control cities as the donor pool. Both approaches yield similar results and show that the substantial
increase in public employment in Bonn has only resulted in more modest increases in private sector
employment. In particular, translating the estimated treatment eects from comparing Bonn to its
synthetic control into employment multipliers we nd that each additional public sector job reduces
employment in industry by around 0.2 jobs and creates just over one additional job in other parts of
the private sector.
We next show how this nding can be explained by our model and provide several pieces of evi-
dence for the mechanisms emphasised by the model. First, we provide some suggestive direct evidence
for the amenity and productivity spillovers from public to private employment that the model postu-
lates. This data suggests that there could be amenity spillovers from public employment in Bonn, but
there is little evidence for productivity spillovers. Second, we use data on wages and house prices to
show that house prices are positively related to city size as suggested by the model while the expansion
of public employment has only had very small eects on nominal wages in Bonn by 1987. Third, we
undertake a simple quantitative analysis of the model to explore for which parameters the model can
best t the reduced form evidence. The quantitative analysis suggests that the increase in public em-
ployment has generated sizeable amenity spillovers and if anything marginally negative productivity
spillovers, which reinforces the reduced form evidence on mechanisms.
Our paper contributes to a number of literatures. The idea that expansions in employment in a
tradable sector can have multiplier eects on employment in other sectors in the same location has a
long history with early contributions by Daly (1940), Hildebrand and Mace (1950) and Thompson (1959)
(see Richardson (1985) for a survey of this early work). The early literature in this area used simple
cross-sectional correlations or input-output approaches to estimate multipliers and struggled to isolate
plausibly exogenous variation. To overcome this problems Carrington (1996) uses the exogenous shock
to employment caused by the construction of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline between 1974 and 1977 on
other parts of the Alaskan labor market. Similarly, Black, McKinnish, and Sanders (2005) analyse the
eect of the coal boom in the 1970s and the subsequent coal bust in the 1980s as an exogenous shock
and estimate that each additional mining job created 0.17 non-tradable jobs while the loss of a mining
job implies a loss of 0.34 non-tradable jobs. Moretti (2010) uses a shift-share instrument to isolate
exogenous variation in manufacturing employment across US cities. He estimates that an additional
job in the tradable sector of a US city creates 1.6 additional jobs in the city’s non-tradable sector, with
a larger multiplier eect for additional skilled jobs. Recently, Feyrer, Mansur, and Sacerdote (2017) use
the drilling of new wells during the US fracking boom to examine the spatial and sectoral dispersion
of this shock.
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While governments have some policy instruments to inuence the spatial distribution of manu-
facturing and other tradable employment, they have direct control over the location of public employ-
ment and regularly use re-locations of public employment to support lagging regions. Surprisingly,
there is little systematic evidence on the spillover eects of changes in the spatial distribution of pub-
lic employment on the private sector. An important exception is Faggio and Overman (2014) who
use a shift-share instrument to isolate exogenous variation in public employment across 325 UK local
authorities covering the period 2003 to 2007. They nd that increases in public sector employment
have small but statistically insignicant positive eects on overall private sector employment that are
composed of a decrease in employment in industry and increases in non-tradable sectors.
Other contributions to this literature following Faggio and Overman (2014) are Faggio (2014) who
uses a dierence-in-dierences approach on data covering 2003-2008 to evaluate relocations of public
sector employment from London recommended by the Lyons Review, nding broadly similar results
to Faggio and Overman (2014). Schlüter (2014) investigates whether the opening of federal ministries
in Berlin in 1999 has resulted in faster private sector job creation in areas of Berlin close to the new
ministries. Auricchio, Ciani, and de Blasio (2016) use a shift-share instrument similar to Faggio and
Overman (2014) to estimate the eect of changes in public employment on private employment across
Italians municipalities using data from the 2001 and 2011 census. Jofre-Monseny, Silva, and Vazquez-
Grenno (2017) simulate the impact of public on private employment in a search and matching model
and also show reduced from evidence using Spanish data for 1980, 1990 and 2001. Our approach
diers from Faggio and Overman (2014) and the subsequent literature in three main ways. First, we
are able to observe the long-run impact of a large change in public employment. Second, we use a
natural experiment to provide plausibly exogenous variation to estimate a dierence-in-dierences
strategy to identify the impact of public employment on private employment. Third, we develop a
simple theoretical model which can be calibrated to the reduced form evidence to shed light on the
mechanisms through which public and private employment interact.3,4
Our paper is also related to the wider literature following Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) that
examines amenity and productivity dierences across locations. See, for example, Albouy and Lue
(2015) for a recent contribution. While much of this literature has considered exogenous dierences
in amenities, many urban amenities are plausibly endogenously determined, as in Glaeser, Kolko, and
Saiz (2001), Ahlfeldt, Redding, Sturm, and Wolf (2015) and Diamond (2016). We show that public em-
ployment is potentially an important channel of local amenity dierences across cities. We also con-
tribute to the wider literature on local labor market shocks. One strand of this literature investigates
3 Boeri, Nicoletti, and Scarpetta (2000) and Algan, Cahuc, and Zylberberg (2002) use panel data across a small set of
OECD countries to estimate the impact of higher public employment on private employment at the country level. Although
interesting, these estimates do not fully take into account adding-up constraints, or fully resolve the endogeneity problems
surrounding public employment.
4 A further related literature uses spatial variation to provide new estimates of the government spending multiplier.
See Acconcia and Simonelli (2014) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) for recent contributions.
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the impact of closures of military bases on local economic outcomes (see, for example, aus dem Moore
and Spitz-Oener (2012) for evidence from Germany and Moretti (2011) for a recent survey). Finally,
there is a growing literature that evaluates the eects of place based policies. Recent contributions to
this literature include Kline and Busso (2013) and Kline and Moretti (2014) (see, Neumark and Simpson
(2015) for a recent survey).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section develops a simple theoretical
framework to guide our empirical analysis. Section 3 provides some historical background. Section 4
describes our data and Section 5 our empirical strategy. Section 6 presents our main empirical ndings.
Section 7 provides evidence for the mechanisms through which public and private employment interact
and the nal section concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We develop a simple economic geography model in which both private sector rms and a public sector
employ workers. The model builds on Helpman (1998) and Redding and Sturm (2008). The main
building blocks of the model are developed in this section and a more detailed exposition of the model
is contained in the technical appendix. In the model private sector rms produce varieties of either a
tradable or non-tradable good. The two agglomeration forces are, rst, that rms with better market
access can pay higher nominal wages and, second, consumers with better market access can consume
varieties of the tradable good at lower cost and access more non-tradable varieties. The main dispersion
force are house prices, which increase as more workers move to a city. In equilibrium workers are
indierent across all locations that are populated in equilibrium. The key novel feature of the model is
the presence of a public sector which employs workers and produces a global public good. We treat the
location of public sector jobs as a policy parameter and explore how the distribution of public sector
employment aects the equilibrium distribution of private sector employment.
2.1 Preferences and Technology
The economy consists of a number of locations, which we refer to as cities. The economy is populated
by a mass of representative workers, L, who are mobile across cities and are endowed with a single
unit of labor which is supplied inelastically with zero disutility.5 Utility is dened over a consumption
index of tradable varieties, CTc , a consumption index of non-tradable varieties, CNc , consumption of
housing, CHc , and the amenity level of the city, Bc.6 The upper level utility function is assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas:
Uc = Bc
(
CTc
)µ (
CNc
)θ (
CHc
)1−µ−θ
, 0 < µ, θ < 1. (1)
5 It would not be dicult to extend the model to also include non-working dependents for each worker.
6We use both c and i to index cities. When the distinction is important, we use c to indicate a city when it is consuming
and i to indicate a city when it is producing.
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There are iceberg type transport costs for tradable varities between locations and for one unit of a
variety produced in city i to arrive in city c, a quantity τic > 1 must be shipped. In contrast non-
tradable varieties can only be consumed in the city in which they have been produced.
The tradables consumption index takes the standard CES (Dixit-Stiglitz) form. The dual tradables
price index is as follows:
P Tc =
[∑
i
nTi (p
T
i τic)
1−σ
]1/(1−σ)
, (2)
which uses the fact that all ni tradable varieties produced in city i face the same elasticity of demand
and charge the same equilibrium price pic = Ticpi to consumers in city c. The price index implies that
higher prices in cities i or higher transport costs between cities i and c result in a higher tradables
price index in city c. In contrast non-tradable varieties can only be consumed in the city in which they
are produced. Hence the non-tradable price index in city c is:
PNc =
[
nNc (p
N
c )
1−σ]1/(1−σ) = pNc (nNc )1/(1−σ) , (3)
which depends on the number of non-traded varieties produced in the city (nNc ) and their equilibrium
price (pNc ) and where we have used the fact that all non-tradable varieties in a city charge the same
equilibrium price.
Tradable and non-tradable varieties are produced with the same production technology. There is
a xed cost in terms of labor of producing varieties, F > 0, and a constant variable cost. The total
amount of labor, l, required to produce x units of a variety is:
l = F +
x
ϕi
, (4)
where ϕi captures the productivity of rms in city i. Firms maximise prots ignoring their eect on
the price index. This yields the standard result that the equilibrium free on board price of varieties is
a constant mark-up over marginal cost:
pi =
(
σ
σ − 1
)
wi
ϕi
. (5)
where σ is the constant price elasticity of demand, which is the same for tradable and non-tradable
varieties.
Instead of modelling a construction sector which provides housing we assume a simple housing
supply function that relates house prices to the level of population of a city:
PHc = (Lc)
γ (6)
where γ is the elasticity of house prices with respect to city population.7 We assume that expenditure
on housing in city c, which is a constant share of city c income, is redistributed to the population of
city c through lump-sum transfers.
7 Saiz (2010) provides a full micro-foundation of this housing supply function.
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2.2 Public Sector
The public sector produces a global public good (e.g. defence) that aects all agents in the economy
equally independent of their location. Without loss of generality we normalise the utility that agents
derive from this public good to zero. We assume for simplicity that the total number of public sector
workers in the economy is constant. The key policy decision is the distribution of public employment
across cities where LGi is number of public sector workers in city i.8 Public sector workers in city i
are paid a wage wGi which we assume to be equal to the wage wi that private sector workers in city i
receive.9 To nance public employment the government levies a at income tax τ on the wage income
of both public and private sector workers to exactly satisfy the government budget constraint:
τ
∑
i
(wiLi) =
∑
i
(wiL
G
i ). (7)
We assume that public sector employment in a city generates two potential spillovers to private
sector workers in both the tradable and non-tradable sector in the same city. First, productivity of
private sector workers in city i is:
ϕi = (L
G
i )
α, (8)
where α is the elasticity of the productivity of private sector rms in city i with respect to the size of
the public sector in this city. Similarly, we assume that consumption amenities in city i are determined
by:
Bc = (L
G
c )
δ, (9)
where δ is the elasticity of city amenities with respect to the size of the public sector.
2.3 Spatial Equilibrium
With free labor mobility across cities and also across sectors within cities, workers’ utility has to be
the same in all cities. Substituting the equilibrium demand functions into the utility function (1), equal
utility across cities implies:
wcBc
(P Tc )
µ (PNc )
θ (PHc )
1−µ−θ = k, for all c (10)
where we implicitly assume that all cities are populated in equilibrium. The intuition behind (10) is
that higher wages or higher amenities make a city more attractive, while higher housing costs or a
higher price of tradable or non-tradable varieties make the city less attractive.
8 In the model it is equivalent whether the public sector creates job openings in a particular city, or whether the public
sector has a dedicated workforce that can be moved between cities.
9 It would not be dicult to extend the model so that the public sector pays a higher wage than private sector rms
and public sector employment is rationed in equilibrium. This would marginally change the quantitative implications of
our model but not the qualitative insights.
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2.4 Simulation
Due to the non-linearity of the model we simulate a two-city version of our model as is standard
in the economic geography literature. In particular we start with two ex-ante identical cities and
explore the impact of changes in the location of public employment on private sector activity. For
this simulation we assume central values for the key parameters of the model. First, we assume an
elasticity of substitution (σ) of ve which is similar to the values typically used in the international
trade literature (see, for example, Feenstra (1994); Ghironi and Melitz (2005)). Second, we set the share
of expenditure on housing in total expenditure (1−µ− θ) to one-third which is somewhat larger than
the housing expenditure share of around 0.25 estimated by Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2011) for the US.
Third, we set the share of public employment in total employment to 12 percent which is the average
level of pre-treatment public employment in Bonn and its synthetic control and is also not far from
the 2005 OECD average reported in OECD (2009) as discussed in the introduction. Fourth, we set the
share of expenditure on both tradable output (µ) and non-tradable output (θ) both equal to one-third.
Moretti (2010) and Faggio and Overman (2014) assume that only manufacturing is tradable, which
ignores that some services are also tradable. In contrast, Lombardo and Ravenna (2012) estimate the
share of tradable sectors at the level of countries and report tradable shares in excess of 50 percent of
employment. Fifth, we assume that the iceberg trade cost for tradable output between the two cities
(τic) is equal to 1.25, which is very similar to the average transport costs (excluding border related
costs and wholesale distribution costs) of 21% of the value of goods estimated by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004). Finally, Saiz (2010) estimates a population-weighted average elasticity of housing
supply in US metropolitan areas of 1.75. We are interested in the inverse of this, i.e. the elasticity of
house prices with respect to population (γ), which we set to 1/1.75 = 0.57.10
Figure 1 shows the impact of shifting public employment from city 2 to city 1 for dierent assumed
values of the amenity and productivity spillover parameters δ and α. The gure has a number of
striking features. In the absence of productivity or amenity spillovers (i.e. δ = 0 and α = 0) shifting
public employment from city 2 to city 1 actually reduces total employment in city 1, with particularly
large reductions in private employment in the tradable sector. To see the intuition why private sector
employment has to fall by more than the additional public sector employment in city 1 consider the
following thought experiment. Suppose that one public sector worker migrates from city 2 to city 1
and a private sector worker in the tradables sector migrates at the same time from city 1 to city 2. This
change leaves total employment, nominal wages, house prices and total expenditure in the two cities
unchanged. However, there is now less private sector tradables production in city 1, which increases
the price index of tradables (2) in city 1 relative to city 2 as more varieties are now shipped from city 2
to city 1 involving positive trade costs. To bring about spatial equilibrium more private sector workers
therefore have to leave city 1 until house prices in city 1 have fallen suciently relative to city 2 to make
10 We also normalise the xed costs F , which rescales nominal wages across all cities, to one.
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workers again indierent between locating in city 1 and city 2. The drop in private sector workers
is concentrated in the tradable sector of city 1 due to the Cobb-Douglas specication for the upper
level utility function that implies that non-tradables demand is proportional to city population. The
more than proportional crowd-out of private sector employment depends critically on the assumption
of positive trade costs between cities. If trade between cities was frictionless then the reduction in
private employment in city 1 would be exactly proportional to the increase in public employment and
city size would be unaected by a shift in public employment.
Figure 1 also shows that if there are productivity and amenity spillovers from public sector em-
ployment to the private sector, then the negative impact of shifting public employment to city 1 on
total employment in city 1 can be overturned. In particular, Figure 1 shows both a case of intermedi-
ate spillovers where we set α = 0.004 and δ = 0.004 and a case of stronger spillovers where we set
α = 0.008 and δ = 0.008. With intermediate spillovers total private sector employment in city 1 stays
roughly constant as public employment is relocated to city 1 and total employment therefore increases.
The constant private sector employment in city 1 is made up of a drop in tradables employment and
an similar increase in non-tradables employment in city 1. With strong spillovers both tradable and
non-tradable employment increases in city 1 as public sector employment is added to the city with the
increase being particularly pronounced for non-tradable employment.
Productivity or amenity spillovers that are strong enough to increase total employment in city 1
also increase house prices in city 1. The reason is that house prices depend on nominal expenditure
in each city, which is primarily a function of total city population. The impact of shifts in public
employment on wages in the two cities is somewhat more subtle and quantitatively small. Even in the
no-spillover scenario nominal wages in city 1 increase marginally due to two opposing forces. First,
there is the usual new economic geography mechanism that rms with better market access (i.e. rms
located in the larger city) are able to pay higher nominal wages in a zero prot equilibrium. Second,
public employment creates additional demand for private sector rms that in contrast to additional
demand from workers in the private sector does not increase local competition. The combination of
these two eects results in a small increase in nominal wages in city 1.
We have also simulated the model for the case of only productivity spillovers or only amenity
spillovers. Both types of spillovers have a qualitatively similar impact on private sector employment
in the tradable and non-tradable sector. Both spillovers also have a positive impact on both nominal
wages and house prices in city 1. However, amenity spillovers have a larger positive eect on house
prices than wages relative to the impact of productivity spillovers on house prices and wages. This
prediction of the model is similar in spirit to the classic Roback (1982) analysis. However in contrast
to Roback (1982) in our model both wages and house prices increase if there are amenity spillovers
from increased public employment in city 1 while in Roback (1982) high amenities in a location reduce
wages. Note that from the spatial equilibrium condition (10) also in this model wages and amenities
enter multiplicatively and higher amenities could therefore be oset by lower wages. However, our
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model features positive transport costs which imply that an increase in population due to an increase
in amenities not only increases local housing prices but also improves market access of a city which
in turn enables rms to pay higher wages in a zero prot equilibrium. This market size mechanisms
dominates the classic Roback (1982) trade-o between wages and amenities.11
In summary, the model illustrates how the interaction between public and private employment is
shaped by crowd-out mechanisms through wages and house prices and potential agglomeration forces
through amenity and productivity spillovers from public to private employment. The relative strength
of these mechanisms is an open empirical question to which we now turn. In section 7.5 we return to
the theoretical model and determine for which parameter values it best ts the reduced form evidence.
3 Historical Background
In the wake of the Second World War, Germany was divided into four dierent parts: East and West
Germany, areas that became part of Poland, and an area that became part of the Soviet Union. Berlin,
the pre-war capital of Germany, was situated approximately 200 kilometres to the east of the border
between East and West Germany. Berlin was jointly occupied by U.S., British, French, and Soviet
troops and divided into four sectors of occupation. The origins of Germany’s division can be traced
back to a wartime protocol that organised Germany into zones for the purposes of the post-war military
occupation. With the intensication of the Cold War, cooperation between the Western allies and the
Soviet Union deteriorated and West Germany was founded in 1949 on the area of the U.S., British, and
French zones, while East Germany was founded in the same year on the Soviet zone (see, for example,
Franklin (1963) and Kettenacker (1989)).
As part of the foundation of West Germany, a location for the new West German government had
to be found. There were four main contenders for the seat of government, which in order of their 1939
population were: Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Kassel and Bonn. It was widely believed that Frankfurt was the
obvious choice for several reasons: It had been the seat of the rst German parliament in 1848, it was
the largest of the candidate cities, and it was centrally located in West Germany with good transport
links. However, on 10 May 1949, the West German Parliamentary Council (“Parlamentarische Rat”)
voted narrowly for Bonn as the new capital of West Germany. Of the 65 delegates, 29 voted for Frank-
furt and 33 for Bonn, with one invalid vote and two abstentions. This decision was conrmed by the
newly constituted West German parliament on 3 November 1949 with 200 votes for Bonn versus 176
for Frankfurt (Floehr (1986)).12 A popular myth is that Konrad Adenauer, Germany’s rst post-war
11 Redding and Sturm (2008) and Handbury and Weinstein (2015) for recent evidence for the importance of market access
at the city level.
12 The unexpected choice of a provincial town as Germany’s capital was widely ridiculed. The New York Herald Tribune
called Bonn in 1959 “one of the strangest capitals of the twentieth century”; the English envoys referred to the British
Embassy in Bonn as “Her Majesty’s only mission in a corneld” and a Newsweek correspondent was surprised to see
that his news bureau close to the federal parliament “faced a meadow on which a shepherd grazed his ock every Friday
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chancellor, single-handedly engineered this outcome as he was of an advanced age and lived on the
outskirts of Bonn.13 The truth is likely to be more mundane. First, the heavy military presence of
American troops in Frankfurt was viewed as a disadvantage for an independent West German govern-
ment. Second, making Bonn the new capital was viewed as a signal that the division of Germany was
a temporary arrangement that had to be overcome as soon as possible.
Despite initial hopes that division would be short-lived, it was over time formalised in international
treaties and became widely believed to be permanent.14 However, increasing dissatisfaction among
East Germans led to large scale demonstrations in 1989 and culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall on
9 November 1989. Only eleven months later, on 3 October 1990, East and West Germany were formally
reunied. On 20 June 1991 the German parliament voted in a narrow vote of 338 to 320 to relocate
the parliament and parts of the federal ministries back to Berlin. In return for the loss of status and
economic power, Bonn received generous compensation. This involved nancial compensation, the
allocation of new institutions of national and international signicance, and the agreement that every
federal ministry would have oces both in Berlin and Bonn and the majority of federal government
employment would remain in Bonn. After extensive building works, the parliament moved from Bonn
back to Berlin in September 1999.15
4 Data
Our basic dataset is panel data on employment in Bonn and a set of 40 control cities which were also
located in West Germany. The control cities are the 20 West German cities with a 1939 population
just above Bonn and the 20 cities with a 1939 population just below Bonn. Bonn itself had 152,057
inhabitants in 1939 and was the 31st largest West German city in 1939. The population of the 40
control cities ranges from 83,385 in Bottrop to 458,429 in Stuttgart in 1939. We have also experimented
with using a larger number of control cities but this has no meaningful impact on the results. Figure 2
shows the spatial distribution of Bonn and the 40 control cities.16 The dataset contains observations
from the pre-war censuses in 1925, 1933 and 1939 as well as data from the post-war censuses in 1946,
1950, 1961, 1970 and 1987. To make cities as comparable as possible over time, we follow Redding and
Sturm (2008) and aggregate settlements that had at least 10,000 inhabitants in 1919 and merged with
afternoon” (as cited in Wise (1998)).
13 A common German joke at the time was that “If you say ‘A’ for Adenauer you also have to say ‘B’ for Bonn”.
14 West German opinion polls in the 1980s show that less than 10 percent of the respondents expected a reunication to
occur during their lifetime (Herdegen (1992)).
15 The extensive compensation and limited relocation of federal ministries suggest that the relocation of the federal
government back to Berlin was a much smaller shock for Bonn. Consistent with this there is no evidence for a change in
the growth rate of population or employment in Bonn in the years after 1999. In this paper we therefore concentrate on
the much larger and cleaner shock of the arrival of the federal government in Bonn in the wake of the Second World War.
16 We exclude the city of Saarbrücken from the control group, because Saarbrücken was under the rule of the League of
Nations from 1919 to 1935 and under French rule from 1945 to 1957.
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one of our cities during the sample period in all years in the data. A list of all aggregations is contained
in the technical appendix.
Due to Germany’s federal structure in the post-war period, census employment data at the city
level is published by the statistical oces of the dierent West German states (“Länder”) while the
pre-war data was published by the Statistical Oce of Germany (“Statistisches Reichsamt”).17 We
are able to disaggregate total employment into 10 sectors (“Wirtschaftsabteilungen"). These 10 sectors
have been used unchanged in the 1961, 1970 and 1987 censuses. We use a concordance to aggregate the
employment data from the 1950 and 1946 censuses to the same 10 sectors. The 1933 and 1925 censuses
have also published employment data at the city level for a large number of sectors. We have developed
a concordance to aggregate this data to the same 10 sectors that are used in the post-war data. The
1939 census has only published employment at the city level in four sectors which are aggregates of
the 10 sectors. We use the 1933 employment shares in each city to disaggregate employment in 1939
in these four sectors into the same 10 sectors that we use for other years. Dropping the 1939 data from
the sample makes no dierence to our results.18
The 10 sectors into which we are able to disaggregate employment (and their 1987 German name)
are agriculture (“Land- und Forstwirtschaft und Fischerei”), mining and energy (“Energie- und Wasser-
versorgung und Bergbau”), construction (“Baugewerbe”), industry (“Verarbeitendes Gewerbe”), trade
(“Handel”), transport and communication (“Verkehr und Nachrichtenübermittlung”), nance and in-
surance (“Kreditinstitute und Versicherungsgewerbe”), other services (“Dienstleistungen von Unter-
nehmen und freien Berufen”), non-prot sector (“Organisationen ohne Erwerbszweck und private
Haushalte”), public sector (“Gebietskörperschaften und Sozialversicherung”). Agricultural employ-
ment is very low in our sample of cities and we omit it when we disaggregate total employment into
its sectors. Public employment in the 1961 to 1987 censuses consists of a conservative denition of
public employment that only includes employment in the public administration and social security ad-
ministration. It does not include employment in the health sector and education which are both part of
“other services”, and also does not include employment in state owned enterprises. Across Bonn and
the control cities the average share of public employment in total employment in our data is just over
12% in 1987, which is similar to the 2005 average of the 10 countries discussed in the introduction.19
In addition to the employment data we have collected a number of datasets to provide evidence for
the mechanisms emphasised by our model. First, we use data reported in Deutscher Städtetag (1988),
17 The technical appendix provides detailed information on the publications of each regional statistical oce from which
the data has been compiled.
18 Details of the concordance and how we disaggregate the data reported in 4 sectors for 1939 into 10 sectors are provided
in the technical appendix. We also use a similar imputation to disaggregate employment reported in 4 sectors into 10 sectors
for a small number of additional observations due to missing 10 sector employment breakdowns for smaller cities.
19 As discussed in detail in Section 2 of the technical appendix, data limitations in the earlier years of our long time
series imply that the denition of public employment changes slightly over time. In particular, in the pre-war censuses of
1925, 1933 and 1939 public employment includes the military and the clergy and in 1950 it includes employment by the
occupying forces and foreign embassies.
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which contains a number of proxies for consumption amenities across the cities in our sample in 1987.
We have also obtain similar data for 1929/1930 for a much smaller number of proxies for amenities
from Deutscher Städtetag (1931). Second, we have collected data on gross value added per worker in
Bonn and the control cities from Gemeinschaftsveröentlichung der Statistischen Landesämter (1991).
Third, we use data from the Historic Employment and Establishment Statistics (HES) database (see
Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000) for a detailed description) for 1987 that allows us to estimate individual-
level wage regressions. While comparable wage data do not exist for the pre-war period, we proxy
pre-war wage dierences across cities with information on payroll tax receipts in 1937 reported in
Statistisches Reichsamt (1941). Finally, we have obtained data for 1986 to 1988 on the average price of
dierent types of real estate across a sample of West German cities from the Association of Real Estate
Agents (“Ring Deutscher Makler - RDM”).
5 Empirical Approach
Our basic empirical approach is a simple dierence-in-dierences comparison of Bonn and our 40
control cities:
Yct = γ + Tc + Tc ×Dt + λt + εct (11)
where Yct is employment in city c in period t and employment can be total employment or employment
in subsectors depending on the specication; Tc is a dummy that is equal to one for Bonn and zero
otherwise; Dt is a dummy that is equal to one after 1949 and zero otherwise; λt is a full set of time
dummies; εct is an error term. As we observe Bonn and the control group of cities for several periods
prior to treatment, we can assess whether the treatment city and control group of cities move in parallel
before the treatment. Whereas dierence-in-dierences comparisons are one of the classic approaches
to analyse natural experiments, there are two potential concerns with this approach in our setting.
First, as we only have one treatment unit (Bonn), it is particularly important to compare this city to
a control group that is as similar to Bonn as possible. Second, Conley and Taber (2011) point out that
clustering standard errors at the level of cities is likely to underestimate standard errors if there is only
one treatment unit in a dierence-in-dierences regression.
To address both of these concerns, we also construct a synthetic control city for Bonn as proposed
by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and extended by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010). The
main idea of the synthetic control method (SCM) is to acknowledge that a simple average of other
cities may not be a good enough control, and instead to let the data speak and search for a weighted
average of cities that best mimics the pre-treatment trend (predictors) in Bonn. More formally, let
J be the number of available control cities (‘donor pool’), where J is equal to 40 in our application.
Let W = (w1, ..., wJ)′ be a (J × 1) vector of nonnegative weights which sum to one. The scalar
wj represents the weight of city j in the synthetic Bonn. The synthetic control method chooses the
weights W so that the synthetic Bonn most closely resembles the actual one before 1949.
13
To understand how the weights are determined, let X1 be a (K × 1) vector of pre-1949 values of
K employment predictors for Bonn. Similar to X1, X0 is dened as a (K × J) matrix which contains
the values of the same employment predictors for the J possible control cities. We include in X1
and X0 both pre-treatment values of employment and exogenous covariates. In particular we include
in all specications the pre-treatment values of employment in the non-tradable sector, the tradable
sector and the public sector.20 These employment variables capture dierences in sectoral employment
patterns that may aect the post-treatment trend. As exogenous covariates that could inuence post-
war employment growth we include a dummy for proximity (75 kilometers) to the German-German
border to control for market access changes as in Redding and Sturm (2008) and two measures of war-
related destruction reported in Kästner (1949): the amount of rubble in cubic meters per capita and the
percentage of the 1939 housing stock that has been destroyed.
Let V be a diagonal matrix with non-negative components. The values of the diagonal elements of
V reect the relative importance of the K employment predictors in the construction of the synthetic
control. The vector of weights W is chosen to minimize the objective function:
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ) subject to wj ≥ 0. (12)
The optimal weightsW ∗ that minimises this objective function clearly depend on the choice of weight-
ing matrix V . We follow Gobillon and Magnac (2016) and set V to be the identity matrix, which gives
equal weights to all predictor variables. Alternatively, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Di-
amond, and Hainmueller (2010) propose a data-driven procedure to choose V such that employment
before 1949 is best reproduced by the synthetic control dened by W ∗(V ), i.e. the RMSPE is min-
imised over the pre-treatment period. We have also estimated this alternative specication and nd
very similar results with this approach and our results are therefore not sensitive to the choice of V .21
The treatment eects α1t for Bonn in the post-treatment years t = 1950, 1961, 1970, 1987 are then
estimated as the dierence between Bonn and the synthetic control city:
αˆ1t = Y1t − Y0tW ∗ (13)
where Y1t is the outcome for Bonn in year t and Y0t is a (row) vector with the same outcome for the J
control cities in year t. Since we use employment in the tradable, non-tradable and public sector as our
predictor variables no matter whether the outcome variable is total employment or employment in one
of our sub-sectors, the weights W ∗ do not change across outcomes. This is our preferred specication
because it ensures that the synthetic control for Bonn does not vary across specications and the
estimated treatment eects for the dierent sub-sectors add up to the estimated treatment eect for
total employment.22
20 We discuss in Section 6 below how we dene employment in the tradable and non-tradable sector.
21 Kaul, Klößner, Pfeifer, and Schieler (2017) argue that using all outcome lags as separate predictors renders the other
covariates irrelevant. This concern does not apply to our procedure since using the identity matrix for V assigns equal
weights to all covariates.
22 In unreported specications we have also just used the pre-treatment values of the respective measure of employment
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6 Basic Results
In this section, we use both dierence-in-dierences and the synthetic control method to establish a
counterfactual for Bonn in the absence of the arrival of the federal government. We begin by looking
at three outcomes: total employment, public sector employment and private sector employment. We
then further disaggregate private employment into its sub-sectors to examine the heterogeneity of the
impact of increases in public employment on dierent parts of the private sector.
6.1 The development of public, private and total employment
Figure 3 shows our basic results for the impact of the arrival of the federal government in Bonn on
public employment, private employment and total employment. The three panels on the left hand
side of the gure compare Bonn (solid line) to the average of the 40 control cities (dashed line) in a
dierence-in-dierences comparison while the three panels of the right hand side compare Bonn to
its synthetic control. The synthetic Bonn is a weighted average of the cities of Heidelberg (16.8%),
Kiel (0.2%), Koblenz (34.6%), Mannheim (4.7%), Münster (8.1%), Stuttgart (7.0%), Wiesbaden (25.4%),
and Wilhelmshaven (3.2%).23 Table 1 compares the similarity between Bonn and both the unweighted
average of the 40 control cities and the synthetic Bonn before the treatment. The table shows that
across the predictor variables, i.e. the pre-treatment values of non-tradable employment, tradable em-
ployment and public employment as well as our exogenous growth predictors, Bonn is more similar
to the synthetic Bonn than the average of the 40 control cities.
The closer t between Bonn and its synthetic control compared to the average of the 40 control
cities is also visible in Figure 3. Even though we use the same weights to compute the synthetic control
for total, public and private employment in Bonn, we nd that Bonn and its synthetic control track
each other very closely both in terms of levels and growth rates before Bonn becomes the capital of
West Germany in 1949. In contrast, Bonn and the average of the 40 control cities are not as close to each
other, particularly for private sector and total employment. Bonn has less private sector employment
than the average of the 40 control cities and the treatment and control group also have slightly dierent
growth rates. The same dierence between Bonn and the average of the 40 control cities is also visible
in total employment in years prior to the arrival of the federal government.
Comparing Bonn to either the average of the 40 control cities or the synthetic Bonn after 1949
reveals a number of striking patterns. First, public employment increases rapidly in Bonn relative to
either counterfactual.
as a predictor variables (along with our exogenous covariates). Doing so results in dierent weights W ∗ across specica-
tions with dierent measures of employment as the dependent variable. Reassuringly, these alternative specications lead
to very similar results even though the treatment eects estimated for sub-sectors do not exactly add up to the estimated
treatment eect for total employment.
23 As noted before, we will use these weights for all subsequent sub-sector specications such as, for example, public
sector and private sector employment.
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Comparing the change in public sector employment in Bonn between 1987 and the pre-treatment
years to the same change in the synthetic control we nd a treatment eect on public sector employ-
ment in Bonn of just over 15,600.24 When we compare the change in public employment in Bonn to the
change in public employment in the un-weighted average of the 40 control cities, we nd a marginally
larger treatment eect on public employment. Second, this rapid expansion of public employment is
not mirrored in an equally rapid expansion of private employment in Bonn. Comparing the change in
private sector employment in Bonn to the same change in the synthetic control we nd a treatment
eect on private sector employment in Bonn of just under 13,400 private sector workers. Comparing
Bonn to the un-weighted average of the 40 control cities instead results in a larger treatment eect of
just over 21,600 private sector workers, but this estimate seems less reliable due to the much poorer
t between Bonn and the average of the 40 control cities during the pre-treatment years in terms of
private sector employment. Third, as total employment is the sum of public and private employment,
total employment also rises rapidly in Bonn relative to either counterfactual. The relative increase in
public employment in Bonn is reected in the development of the percentage share of public employ-
ment in total employment in Bonn, which increases from an average of 12.1% in the pre-treatment
years to 24.7% in 1987. In contrast, in the synthetic control the percentage share of public employment
in total employment increases from an average of 11.9% in the pre-treatment years to 14.8% in 1987.
The results suggest that while the average of the 40 control cities and the synthetic control are two
quite dierent counterfactuals, they produce fairly similar treatment eects of the arrival of the federal
government in Bonn. The similarity of the results across these two very dierent counterfactuals is
re-assuring as it suggests that the estimated treatment eects do not depend sensitively on the details
how one constructs a counterfactual for Bonn. In what follows we concentrate on the results using
the synthetic Bonn as the counterfactual, which ensures the closest possible t between Bonn and
its counterfactual prior to treatment, but the results would be qualitatively similar if we used the un-
weighted average of the control cities as the counterfactual for Bonn instead.
To illustrate the magnitude of the eects that we nd and to compare the results to the existing
literature we convert our treatment eects into simple employment multipliers. Dividing the treat-
ment eect of the arrival of the federal government in Bonn on private sector employment (using our
synthetic control for Bonn as the counterfactual) by the analogous treatment eect on public sector
employment we nd that each additional public sector job in Bonn has created approximately 0.86 ad-
ditional jobs in the private sector. This eect is substantially smaller than the results in Moretti (2010)
who nds that an additional job in the tradable sector of a US city creates 1.6 additional jobs in the
city’s non-tradable sector, with even larger multiplier eects for additional skilled jobs. Our multiplier
24 This treatment eect is computed as the change in public sector employment in Bonn between the average of the
pre-treatment observations (1925, 1933, 1939 and 1946) and 1987 of 21,428 compared with the analogous change in the
synthetic control for Bonn of 5,791 which results in a treatment eect of 21,428 - 5,791 = 15,637. Other treatment eects in
this section are computed analogously.
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is somewhat larger than the multiplier of 0.2 estimated by Faggio and Overman (2014) in their preferred
specication, but their multipliers range from 0.07 to 0.86 across alternative specications. There are
a number of reasons why the employment spillovers from additional public employment could be
substantially smaller than that of additional manufacturing employment. For example, input-output
linkages between the manufacturing sector and other sectors may attract additional employment to a
location while the public sector likely has much fewer input-output linkages. We return to this point
in Section 7 when we examine the potential mechanisms that link changes in public employment to
changes in private employment.
6.2 Heterogeneity across dierent parts of the private sector
The results so far show that public employment in Bonn has increased substantially after the arrival
of the federal government in Bonn while the increase in private-sector employment has been more
modest. In this section we use our data on the breakdown of overall employment into ten sectors,
discussed in Section 4 above, to examine the heterogeneity of the changes in employment across sec-
tors. The ten sub-sectors include agricultural employment, which is so small in all years of our data
for Bonn and the 40 control cities that we omit this sector. This leaves nine sectors, one of which is
public employment.
The simulations of our model in Figure 1 show that changes in public sector employment should
have a dierential impact on private employment in the tradable and non-tradable sector regardless
of the strength of amenity or productivity spillovers. In particular, as discussed in more detail in
Section 2.4, the impact of an increase in public employment should have a more positive eect on
employment in the non-tradable sector compared to employment in the tradable sector. The intuition
is that additional public employment creates additional demand for non-tradables, which can only be
produced locally even if local housing costs and wages increase. In contrast higher rents and housing
costs reduce employment in the local tradable sector, where the increase in local demand can also be
met by rms from other cities.
In Figure 4 we show the development of Bonn and its synthetic control across all nine sectors
without taking a stance on the tradability of the output of each of these sectors. The synthetic Bonn is
computed using the same xed weights as before which ensures that the treatment eects across the
dierent sub-sectors add up to the treatment eect on total employment. The gure shows that for
a number of the nine sectors there is hardly any visible treatment eect of the arrival of the federal
government in Bonn.25 However, there are also notable exceptions to this pattern. First, the nal
panel shows the large increase in public employment in Bonn relative to its synthetic control, which
is just reproduced here from Figure 3. Second, the largest positive treatment eect on private sector
employment is in the sector “other service employment”. This sector contains a broad set of service
25 We examine the statistical signicance of the treatment eects across the dierent sub-sectors formally below.
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employment categories including employment in restaurants, hotels and theaters, business services,
personal services and hair dressers. Third, also employment in the non-prot sector experiences a
clearly visible increase relative to the synthetic Bonn.
To link the reduced form evidence closer to the model Figure 5 aggregates private employment
across the eight categories shown in Figure 4 into a tradable and non-tradable sector. The tradable
sector is simply industry employment while non-tradable employment is the sum across employment
in all service sectors (excluding public employment). While this classication is not perfect it should
provide a rst-order approximation to the tradability of dierent sectors. The gure shows that in line
with the predictions of our theoretical model the arrival of the federal government in Bonn has had a
positive impact on non-tradable employment while the impact on the tradable sector is much smaller
and actually negative in our point estimate. Converted into employment multipliers, we nd that each
additional job in public employment reduces employment in the tradable sector by 0.19 jobs while it
creates 1.05 additional jobs in the non-tradable sector.
Figure 6 investigates the statistical signicance of the treatment eects across the dierent sectors
shown in Figure 4. This graph combines 39 placebo estimates for the cities in our donor pool (grey
lines) with the graph for Bonn (black line). Note that we plot 39 instead of 40 placebo graphs because
the city with the largest employment (Stuttgart) cannot be reproduced with any combination of cities
in our sample.26 Each line in this gure shows the dierence between a city and its synthetic control.
In addition to the 39 placebo graphs, the shaded area encloses the region between the 5th and the 95th
percentile of the distribution of placebo graphs. In terms of public employment, Bonn’s post-1949
development is more pronounced than that of all other cities. This provides strong evidence for the
uniqueness of Bonn’s development. Bonn’s treatment eect in terms of the non-prot sector employ-
ment growth is also clearly statistically signicant. The increase in other service employment, which
shows the quantitatively largest increase in private sector employment is only marginally statistically
signicant due to a set of more noisy placebo treatment eects. Finally the small decline in industry
employment in Bonn relative to its synthetic control is entirely statistically insignicant with rather
noisy placebo treatment eects.
In summary, in this section we have shown that comparing Bonn to its synthetic control over the
period from 1925 to 1987 reveals that the arrival of the federal government in Bonn after 1949 has
resulted in a substantial increase in public employment. At the same time the increase in private em-
ployment has been more modest and has been concentrated in the non-tradable sector, while industrial
employment in Bonn has experienced a small but statistically insignicant decline. We now analyze
the possible mechanisms suggested by our theoretical model that link the development of public and
private sector employment in a location.
26 This is a well-known limitation of placebo exercises, or rather the synthetic control method when the treated city (in
the context of the placebo exercise this is Stuttgart) is at the top or bottom of the distribution.
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7 Mechanisms
The previous section has shown that in the wake of the arrival of the federal government in Bonn,
the city has experienced a dramatic expansion in total employment. However, this expansion was
driven by a large expansion in public employment, while private sector employment has increased
more modestly. In this section, we interpret this nding in the light of our theoretical model and
provide a number of pieces of evidence for the mechanisms emphasised by the model. First, we provide
some suggestive direct evidence for the amenity and productivity spillovers from public to private
employment that the model postulates. Second, we show that proxies for long-term changes in wages
are in line with the predictions of the model. Third, we provide evidence that house prices in Bonn
responded in the way predicted by the model. Finally, we undertake a simple quantitative analysis of
the model to see for which spillover parameters the model best ts the reduced form evidence.
7.1 Amenity Spillovers
The two key spillovers emphasised by the model are amenity and productivity spillovers from public
to private sector employment. In this section we provide some suggestive evidence that there are likely
to be substantial amenity spillovers from public employment in Bonn. Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz (2001)
discuss four consumption amenities in cities that they consider to be key to urban success. First, the
size and diversity of local services and consumer goods including restaurants and live performance
theatres. Second, aesthetics and the physical setting which involves the built environment as well as
the natural environment. Third, the quality of public services including good schools and low crime
rates. Finally, the speed of public transportation to facilitate commuting. While some of the these
amenities such as the natural environment are dicult to change, most can be changed through local
interventions.
Table 2 shows a set of simple cross-sectional regressions which compare Bonn in 1987 to the con-
trol cities for a number of proxies for local amenities in the spirit of Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz (2001).
The regressions control for a university town dummy, state capital dummy and the logarithm of 1987
population. Across many of these regressions Bonn has substantially higher values of amenities than
the control group of cities. Column (1), for example, suggests that cultural spending by the city of
Bonn is around 50% higher than in the control group of cities. Column (2) shows that total expendi-
ture in Bonn is less than 10% higher than in the control group, so the substantially higher expenditure
on culture implies a higher share of spending on cultural amenities in Bonn. Columns (3) to (7) shed
more light on the cultural sector. Columns (3), (4) and (5) together suggest that Bonn has substantially
larger expenses on theaters, which are not driven by a larger employment of actors, but by a higher
wage bill. If higher wages of actors in Bonn reected higher quality of actors, Bonn would stage better
productions than comparable cities. Column (6), in turn, suggests that these high-quality productions
are not attended by more visitors, though. It is also instructive to look at the number of artists more
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broadly. While theatres are generally publicly funded, the number of artists comprises both those em-
ployed in public institutions and those who are self-employed or dependent employees in the private
sector. A larger share of artists in Bonn in Column (7) suggests that Bonn oers a richer (or more
high-quality) cultural environment not only in the public sector, but overall. Going beyond the cul-
tural sector, Columns (8) and (9) look at medical provision. Bonn has a larger number of doctors and a
larger number of hospital beds than the control cities. Finally, turning to schooling quality, as proxied
by class size (student-teacher ratios), Bonn does not seem to stand out in this dimension as we nd
no statistically signicant dierence between Bonn and the control cities. While these regressions are
simple cross-sectional regressions, they provide suggestive evidence for Bonn oering a substantially
dierent set of amenities than other German cites of a similar size.
It is unfortunately not possible to compile comparable pre-war data for the same set of amenity
proxies that we observe in 1987 and we therefore cannot compare the change in these proxies in Bonn
to the change in the synthetic control for Bonn. We have, however, been able to nd data for 1929/1930
for a smaller number of similar proxies for amenities before the Second World War. This data is shown
in Figure 7 which scatters the pre-war data for the number of classrooms in primary schools, the
student teacher ratio, the number of theater seats and the number of theater shows against the 1939
population of each city in our sample together with a linear regression. The gure shows that across
all of these proxies for pre-war amenities Bonn was if anything marginally below the average of the
control cities. In particular it has fewer classrooms and somewhat larger class sizes than the average
city in our sample conditional on population. The number of theatre seats and theatre shows lies
almost exactly on the regression line. This evidence suggests that Bonn did not have better amenities
before the Second World War, consistent with the idea that the higher values of the amenities proxies
that we observe in Bonn in 1987 are indeed caused by the arrival of the federal government in Bonn
and are not due to a pre-existing dierence between Bonn and the control cities.
7.2 Productivity Spillovers
We will now turn to potential productivity spillovers from increased public employment in Bonn. Ide-
ally, this exercise would involve rm-level productivity estimations for rms in Bonn and the control
group. Unfortunately, such data are not available for the time under investigation, neither from na-
tional statistics nor from AMADEUS (a European subset of the ORBIS rm database by Bureau van
Dijk).27 In the absence of data that would allow us to estimate rm-level productivity regressions,
we present regressions of city-level gross value added in the industry sector and the trade and trans-
portation sector (Gemeinschaftsveröentlichung der Statistischen Landesämter 1991) on controls for
27 To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study by Bernard and Wagner (1997) that uses plant-level data in this
time. However, the study is restricted to one federal state, Lower Saxony, and comparable data for other states are not
available before 1995. After that, the research data center of the federal states’ statistical oces provides access to some
ocial rm data (see Malchin and Voshage 2009).
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university town status, state capital status, log population and a dummy variable for Bonn in 1988.
The regressions in Table 3 show a clear picture. There is no evidence that gross value added per
worker in Bonn is higher than in the control group. Instead, we nd negative and statistically sig-
nicant dierences between gross value added per worker in Bonn and the control group of cities in
the industry sector and an insignicant eect that is close to zero for the trade and transportation
sector. With the data limitations in mind, Columns (1) to (3) suggest that industry gross value added
in Bonn is between 27-39 percent lower than in the control group. For the trade and transportation
sector, the unconditional specication in Column (4) suggests a 17 percent higher gross value added
in Bonn than in the control group but the size of this eect drops to close to zero and becomes statis-
tically insignicant once we add controls. Finally, when we combine both sectors in Columns (7) to
(9), the estimated dierence in gross value added suggests a 12-25 percent lower value in Bonn than
in the control group. Given the crude data and the lack of information about the cities’ productivity
before the Second World War, we do not attempt to interpret the magnitude of the eects. Instead,
we cautiously interpret these regressions as suggestive evidence that public employment is unlikely
to produce productive spillovers that benet private sector rms.
7.3 Nominal Wages
To investigate how the large increase in employment aected nominal wages in Bonn, we use a 5% ran-
dom sub-sample of wages from the Historic Employment and Establishment Statistics (HES) database
for 1987 and estimate whether wages in Bonn are higher compared to the control cities. The HES data
report workers’ daily wages, their industry and occupation, and socio-demographic characteristics
such as educational attainment, gender, age, and place of work. The wage information is very reliable,
since it is used to determine social insurance contributions. One drawback of the data is that wages are
censored due to the limit for compulsory social insurance payments.28 To control for this, we include
a dummy variable for observations where wages are top-coded. Alternatively, we have also imputed
the truncated wages following Gartner (2005). The data exclude civil servants and self-employed in-
dividuals which are not covered by the social security system.29
Table 4 shows the results of the wage regressions. In Column (1), we present a bivariate regression
showing that wages are, on average, 2% lower in Bonn than in the set of 40 control cities. In Columns
(2) to (4), we add a number of control variables. In Column (2), we add experience and experience
squared, education, gender and a foreigner dummy. Additionally, we include interactions between
experience, experience squared, gender, education and nationality as suggested by Beaudry, Green,
and Sand (2012). In Column (3), we add dummies for 88 two-digit industries. In Column (4) we add a
control for the logarithm of income tax revenue per capita for 1937 in each city in the sample. This
28 This aects only 9.6 percent of the observations.
29 We also drop from the sample workers younger than 18 or older than 65 and we also exclude all individuals in training
and in part-time employment since there is no information on hours worked in the HES.
21
variable controls for potential pre-existing dierences in income before Bonn became capital. One
can think of this regression as a quasi-dierence-in-dierences regression. In Column (4) the Bonn
dummy is positive and statistically signicant suggesting that wages in Bonn were about 2.4% higher
than in the control cities.30
The remaining columns of the table consider several further robustness checks. In Column (5) we
impute the truncated wages following Gartner (2005), which has minimal impact on the results. Finally,
in Column (6) we add a control for log population. In line with the existing literature the coecient
estimate for total population suggests that larger cities pay somewhat higher nominal wages. The
Bonn dummy becomes slightly smaller but remains statistically signicant.31 Taken together, these
results suggest that there has been a modest increase in nominal wages in Bonn relative to the control
group of cities.
7.4 House Prices
We now investigate to what extent house prices have likely responded to a change in employment
and hence population in Bonn. Recent work by Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2016) exploits mi-
cro data on individual land transactions in French cities to isolate the causal eect of an increase in
population on the price of land and through this on the price of housing. They show that in line
with the predictions of standard economic geography models of the kind developed in this paper, an
inow of population increases housing prices in a city. Saiz (2010) provides similar estimates for US
metropolitan areas.
Comparable micro data on house or land prices is currently unfortunately not available for Ger-
many as information on real estate transactions is held locally and not reported to a national database.
However, we have been able to obtain data from the Association of Real Estate Agents that reports the
average price of transactions across four dierent types of real estate for a number of German cities.
Specically, the data report the average rental price of new-build ats along with the average purchase
price of new-build ats, new-build semi-detached houses and new-build detached houses. This data
is far from perfect as it covers a subset of German cities that only partially overlaps with the cities in
our sample, only reports average prices and is unlikely to capture the universe of transactions.
Figure 8 correlates the logarithm of this data against the logarithm of population in 1987 for each
city for which the Association of Real Estate Agents reports data (which is a somewhat dierent sample
of cities than our control cities) and also shows a linear regression. The gure shows that there is a clear
positive correlation between the dierent measures of house prices and the logarithm of population.
Bonn is close to the regression line for most measures of housing prices reported by the RDM. This
suggests that also in Germany there is likely to be a causal relationship between city size and house
30 Using income tax revenue per capita for 1928 yields very similar results.
31 Note that the population of Bonn is by construction of the sample close to the average population of the cities in the
sample and the Bonn dummy should therefore not be substantially correlated with the population control variable.
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prices and that Bonn is no exception to this relationship. Taken together this provides suggestive
evidence that the dispersion mechanism of higher real estate prices emphasised by our model seems
to be operating also in Germany.
7.5 Quantitative Analysis of the Model
We now undertake a simple quantitative analysis of the theoretical model to see whether the model can
match the key features of our reduced from results. In particular we are going to search for values of
the amenity and productivity spillover (δ and α respectively) and the share of total public employment
located in Bonn for which the model can best match the reduced form evidence. In doing so, we
maintain other parameters of the model, such as the elasticity of substitution, at central values from
the existing literature. The simulations in Figure 1 show that conditional on the other parameters of the
model, the strength of amenity and productivity spillovers and the share of total public employment
located in each of the two cities in the model uniquely determine the distribution of public and private
employment in our model. Intuitively, the distribution of public employment produces spillovers to
the private sector in the model and the strength of these spillovers depends on the values of δ and α.
These three parameters are identied using three moments in the data. The rst moment is the
increase in the share of public employment in total employment in Bonn relative to the synthetic
control city. As discussed in Section 6.1, the share of public employment in Bonn increases by ap-
proximately 12.6 percentage points between the pre-treatment years and 1987 while the same change
in the synthetic control is just under 3 percentage points resulting in a treatment eect of 9.6 per-
centage points, which we target in the quantitative analysis. The second moment is the increase in
private employment in Bonn relative to its synthetic control. As also discussed in 6.1 this treatment
eect on private employment in Bonn is just under 13,400 workers. For the quantitative analysis we
convert this treatment eect into a percentage change to abstract from changes in the overall level
of employment in West Germany between the pre-treatment years and 1987. The increase in private
employment in Bonn between the pre-treatment years and 1987 is 63.9% while the same change in
the synthetic control is 38.5%, resulting in a treatment eect of 63.9% - 38.5% = 25.4%. We target this
25.4 percentage point dierence in the model. The third moment is the dierence in wages between
Bonn and the control cities estimated in Section 7.3 above. The results in Column (4) of Table 4 show
that wages in Bonn are 2.4% higher than in the control cities after controlling for observable worker
characteristics and also 1937 dierences in income tax per capita receipts across cities. We therefore
target a wage dierence of 2.4% in the quantitative analysis.
The intuition how these moments are able to identify the three parameters is as follows. The change
in private employment in Bonn helps to identify the magnitude of a combination of amenity and
productivity spillovers. If both of these spillovers are zero, then private employment in Bonn declines
in the model due its negative impact on house prices and the price index for tradables. Similarly, a
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high level of these spillovers would make the city with more public employment also more attractive
for private employment resulting in an increase in private employment. Second, the dierence in
the share in public employment in total employment between Bonn and the synthetic control city pins
down the share of total public employment that is located in Bonn, i.e the inequality in the distribution
of public employment across cities. Third, the dierence in wages across Bonn and the control cities
identies the relative strength of amenity and productivity spillovers. While both higher productivity
and amenity spillovers from public employment increase wages and house prices in the city with
more public employment, productivity spillovers have a comparatively stronger eect on wages than
amenity spillovers.
To determine the values of these three parameters we perform a grid-search over values for α and
δ between -0.08 and 0.08 in steps of 0.002 and the share of public employment in Bonn between 0.7
and 0.8 in steps of 0.01 which involves evaluating 72,171 parameter combinations.32 Table 5 shows
the ten best t values of amenity and productivity spillovers and the share of total public employment
located in each of the two cities in the model. For the best t parameters the estimated productivity
spillover of public employment is negative but close to zero, while the estimated amenity spillover of
public employment is positive. The point estimates imply that that doubling public employment in a
city reduces productivity in the private sector by about 0.4% while amenities in the city increase by
about 1.8%. The parameter estimates are fairly similar across the 10 best t parameter values shown
in Table 5 which suggests that the objective function dened by the three moments is well-behaved
and has a unique global minimum. To further examine how well the moments identify the magnitude
of the productivity and amenity spillover Figure 9 shows the objective function for dierent values of
amenity and productivity spillovers holding the share of public employment constant at the value that
minimises the objective function. The graph shows a clearly dened valley around the best t parame-
ter combination for the amenity and productivity spillover. The shape of the objective function shows
that the sum of amenity and productivity spillovers are tightly identied. Distinguishing between the
relative strength of amenity and productivity spillovers is harder but the objective function also has a
clearly visible curvature in this dimension.
Overall, the results of the quantitative analysis are consistent with and complement the reduced
form evidence on the mechanisms. Both the quantitative analysis and the reduced from evidence
suggest that the increase in public employment has increased amenities in Bonn but has at best left
productivity in the private sector unchanged.
32 We rst evaluated a coarse grid with values of α and δ between -0.08 and 0.08 and public employment shares between
0.5 and 0.9 to conrm that the global minimum of the objective function must involve public employment shares between
0.7 and 0.8.
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8 Conclusion
This paper has used the relocation of the German government from Berlin to Bonn in the wake of the
Second World War as a natural experiment to provide evidence for the eects of public employment
on private sector employment. Comparing Bonn to a control group of ex-ante similar cities and a
synthetic control city, we nd that the substantial increase in public employment in Bonn has only re-
sulted in a more modest increase in private sector employment. Expressed as employment multipliers,
the estimated treatment eects suggest that each additional public sector job reduces employment in
industry by around 0.2 jobs while it creates just over one additional job in other parts of the private
sector. We interpret our results in the context of a simple theoretical model which allows for pro-
ductivity and amenity spillovers from public to private employment. Reduced form evidence suggests
that the mechanism behind our results is an increase in endogenous consumption amenities in Bonn
while productivity in the private sector has at best been unchanged. A simple quantitative analysis
of our theoretical model nds complementary results. While the best t parameter for the estimated
productivity spillover of public employment is negative and close to zero, the best t parameter for
the estimated amenity spillover of public employment is positive and much larger.
More broadly our results contribute to the debate whether relocations of public employment are a
viable policy instrument to support economically lagging regions. As our natural experiment involves
the relocation of the bureaucracy of a federal government our estimated eects should be upper bounds
for the positive spillover eects that additional public sector employment can generate in the private
sector. Some of what we capture as an amenity spillover could, for example, be driven by political
economy forces that diverted additional government expenditure on cultural amenities to Bonn. Sim-
ilarly, associations and other organisation that try to inuence policy are likely attracted by this type
of public employment. This implies that relocations of more mundane types of public employment
to lagging regions could have even smaller spillover eects on private sector activity in the targeted
regions. A full cost-benet analysis of such policies would clearly also need to take other parameters
into account apart from the spillover eects of public employment on private employment.
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Table 1: Balancing Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DiD Synthetic Control
Bonn Control B-C Control B-C
Non-tradable empl. in 1925 (in 1000s) 30.910 35.885 -4.975 29.194 1.716
Non-tradable empl. in 1933 (in 1000s) 33.854 40.578 -6.724 35.617 -1.763
Non-tradable empl. in 1939 (in 1000s) 36.424 43.978 -7.554 39.645 -3.221
Non-tradable empl. in 1946 (in 1000s) 30.111 33.317 -3.206 28.618 1.493
Tradable empl. in 1925 (in 1000s) 20.502 30.084 -9.582 18.965 1.537
Tradable empl. in 1933 (in 1000s) 20.375 30.287 -9.912 20.529 -0.154
Tradable empl. in 1939 (in 1000s) 21.927 34.298 -12.371 22.055 -0.128
Tradable empl. in 1946 (in 1000s) 20.621 30.680 -10.059 22.321 -1.700
Public empl. in 1925 (in 1000s) 4.840 5.407 -0.567 5.509 -0.669
Public empl. in 1933 (in 1000s) 7.000 6.060 0.940 6.165 0.835
Public empl. in 1939 (in 1000s) 6.932 6.588 0.344 7.013 -0.081
Public empl. in 1946 (in 1000s) 10.929 7.361 3.568 10.523 0.406
Border Dummy (within 75km) 0.000 0.125 -0.125 0.002 -0.002
Rubble (in cubic meters per capita) 7.300 12.240 -4.940 7.611 -0.311
Destroyed Housing (as % of 1939 stock) 37.300 39.950 -2.650 36.388 0.912
Notes: The table shows the balance of a set of predictor variables between Bonn and (i) the unweighted average of the 40
control cities (columns 2 and 3) and (ii) the synthetic control group (columns 4 and 5). These predictor varibales are used
to determine the synthetic control group and they include the level of non-tradable employment, tradeable employment
and public employment in all four pre-treatment years, a dummy for locations in proximity (within 75 kilometers) to the
German-German border and two measures of Second World War destruction (rubble and destroyed housing stock).
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Table 2: Proxies for Amenity Spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Cultural Total City Total Budget Employment Wage Bill
Expenditure Expenditure Theaters Actors Actors
Bonn 0.553*** 0.086* 0.665*** -0.071 0.807***
(0.085) (0.044) (0.087) (0.118) (0.109)
log (Population) 1.048*** 1.006*** 0.732*** 0.487** 0.612***
(0.115) (0.094) (0.136) (0.220) (0.180)
University Town 0.560*** 0.154 0.330** 0.144 0.392**
(0.117) (0.095) (0.127) (0.195) (0.162)
State Capital 0.005 0.102 0.188 0.116 0.225
(0.094) (0.157) (0.178) (0.181) (0.185)
Observations 41 39 33 33 32
R-squared 0.793 0.800 0.676 0.310 0.588
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Theater Artists per Number of Hospital Class
Visitors 1,000 Empl Doctors Beds Size
Bonn -0.026 0.235*** 0.233*** 0.281*** 0.022
(0.096) (0.082) (0.061) (0.048) (0.023)
log (Population) 0.536*** 1.008*** 0.735*** 0.526*** 0.005
(0.169) (0.172) (0.075) (0.086) (0.035)
University Town 0.302* 0.863*** 0.394*** 0.440*** -0.094***
(0.160) (0.205) (0.080) (0.086) (0.027)
State Capital 0.182 0.240 0.222 0.081 0.073
(0.163) (0.238) (0.134) (0.094) (0.047)
Observations 33 41 41 41 41
R-squared 0.491 0.698 0.836 0.761 0.238
Notes: All columns report OLS regressions of the logarithm of a city specic amenity measure on a dummy for Bonn and
controls for log population, a university town dummy and a state capital dummy. Dierences in the number of observations
result from missing observations for the city state Bremen with its two cities Bremen and Bremerhaven (Column 2), missing
information for theater outcomes in Solingen, Remscheid, Recklinghausen, Oenbach, Mülheim, Ludwigshafen, Herne and
Bottrop (Columns 2, 4, 6), and missing wage information for artists in Heidelberg (Column 5). Artists in Column (7) include
musicians, performing artists and graphical artists. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.10
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Figure 2: Bonn and the Control Cities
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Note: The map shows the location of the city of Bonn (square) and the 40 control cities that comprise the control group in
the dierence-in-dierences comparisons and the donor pool for the synthetic control approach.
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Figure 3: Total Employment and Private- and Public-Sector Employment: Bonn vs Control
Total employment (Di-in-di) Total employment (Synthetic control)
Public sector employment (Di-in-di) Public sector employment (Synthetic control)
Private sector employment (Di-in-di) Private sector employment (Synthetic control)
Note: The graphs shows employment in Bonn (solid line), compared to the average for the 40 control cities (dotted line
with circles) in thousands in the left-hand panel and compared to a synthetic control city (dotted line with triangles) on
the right hand side. The upper graphs are for total employment, the middle graphs for private-sector employment and
the bottom graphs are for public sector employment. In constructing Bonn’s synthetic control we use the same weights
across dierent specications which are: Heidelberg (16.8%), Kiel (0.2%), Koblenz (34.6%), Mannheim (4.7%), Münster (8.1%),
Stuttgart (7.0%), Wiesbaden (25.4%), and Wilhelmshaven (3.2%). See main text for details.
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Figure 4: Employment in Nine Sectors: Bonn vs Control
Note: The graphs show employment in Bonn (solid line), compared to the synthetic Bonn (dotted line with triangles) for
nine sectors: mining; industry; construction; wholesale trade; nance and insurance; transportation; services; the non-
prot sector; and the public sector. We do not display employment in agriculture as it is very small in the cities in our
sample.
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Figure 5: Private sector employment: tradables vs non-tradables
Note: The graph shows the development of tradable and non-tradable employment in Bonn (bold line) and its synthetic
control (dotted line). Tradable employment is employment in industry, while non-tradable employment is the sum of all
service sector employment (excluding the public sector).
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Figure 6: Synthetic Placebos
Note: The graphs shows placebo treatment eects for 39 of our control cities (excluding Stuttgart as discussed in the main
text) and also the estimated treatment eect for Bonn (bold line). The placebo treatments are estimated by constructing a
synthetic control city for each of the control cities in the donor pool. There are nine placebo graphs corresponding to the
following nine sectors: mining; industry; construction; wholesale trade; nance and insurance; transportation; services;
the non-prot sector; and the public sector. We do not display agriculture which is very small as discussed in the main
text.
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Figure 7: Amenities before the Second World War
Number of school classes 1929 Student teacher ratios 1929
Number of theater seats 1929/30 Number of theater shows 1929/30
Notes: The graphs shows proxies for amenities before Second World War against city size in 1939.
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Figure 8: Real Estate Prices and Population
Rent level for new ats Price for purchase of new at
Price for new semi-detached house Price for new detached house
Notes: The graphs show the logarithm of the average per square meter rent for new-build ats and the logarithm of the
average per square meter purchase price of dierent types of new-build dwellings scattered against the logarithm of 1987
population. See the main text for more detail.
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Figure 9: Examining the Objective Function
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Note: The graphs shows the objective function that we minimise in the quantitative analysis of the model for dierent
values of amenity and productivity spillovers holding the share of public employment constant at value that minimises the
objective function. Dierent colours represent dierent values of the objective function, which has a value of 0.188 for the
best t parameter set. Values of the objective function of more than 250 are top coded and shown in red to improve the
colour contrasts closer to the minimum of the objective function.
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